ABSTRACT: This paper discusses how compiler optimizations influence software reliability when the optimized application is compiled with a technique to enable the software itself to detect and correct radiation-induced control-flow errors. Supported by a comprehensive fault-injection campaign using an established benchmark suite in the embedded systems domain, we show that the compiler is a non-negligible source of noise when hardening the software against radiationinduced soft errors.
INTRODUCTION
Compiler optimizations are taken for granted in modern software development, enabling applications to execute more efficiently in the target hardware architecture. Modern architectures have complex inner structures designed to boost performance, and if the software developer were to be aware of all those inner details, performance optimization would jeopardize the development processes. Compiler optimizations are transparent to the developer, who picks the appropriate ones to the results s/he wants to achieve, or, as it is more common, allowing this task to be performed by the compiler itself by flagging if it should be more or less aggressive in terms of performance.
Industry already offers microprocessors built with 22 nm transistors, with a prediction that by 2026, the size of the transistor will reach 5.9 nm (ITRS, 2012) . This aggressive technology scaling creates a big challenge concerning the reliability of microprocessors using newest technologies. Smaller transistors are more likely to be disrupted by transient sources of errors caused by radiation, known as soft-errors (Borkar, 2005) . Radiation particles originated from cosmic rays when strikes a circuit induces bit flips during software execution, and because transistors are becoming smaller in size, there is a higher probability that these transistors will be disrupted by a single radiation particle with smaller transistors requiring a smaller amount of charge to disrupt their stored logical value. The newest technologies are so sensitive to radiation that their usage will be compromised at the sea level, as predicted in the literature (Normand, 1996) . Rech et al., (2012) have shown that modern graphics processing unit (GPU) cards are susceptible to such an error rate that makes their usage unfeasible in critical embedded systems. However, industry is already investing in GPU architectures as the platform of choice for high performance and low power embedded computing, such as the ARM Mali ® embedded GPU (ARM, n.d.).
The classical solution to harden systems against radiation is the use of spatial redundancy, i.e., the replication of hardware modules. However, spatial redundancy is prohibitive for embedded systems, which usually cannot afford extra costs of hardware area and power. The increase on power is a severe problem, because it is expected that 21% of the entire chip area must be turned off during its operation to meet the available power budget, and an impressive chip area of 50% at 8 nm (Esmaeizadeh, 2011) . This creates the dark silicon problem (Esmaeizadeh, 2011) , i.e., a huge area of the circuit cannot be used during its lifecycle. This problem gets worse when the microprocessor has redundant units, because system's reliability could be compromised if redundant units were turned off. The current solution to this problem is to use radiation-hardened microprocessors, which are designed to endure radiation. The problem with this approach is the low availability, high unit pricing, and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions of those radiation-hardened components. For instance, a 25 MHz microprocessor has a unitary price of $ 200,000.00 (Mehlitz and Penix, 2005) . This high unit pricing makes the use of radiation-hardened microprocessors unfeasible for embedded systems used in aircrafts, not to say about cars and low-end medical devices, such as pacemakers. For these critical embedded systems, where cost and ITAR restrictions are hard constraints, a cheaper, but yet effective approach for reliability against radiation, is necessary.
Software-Implemented Hardware Fault-Tolerance ( SIHFT) (Goloubeva, 2006) is an approach for radiation reliability that adds redundancy in terms of extra instructions or data to the application, keeping the hardware unchanged. SIHFT techniques work by modifying the original program by adding checking mechanisms to it. SIHFT techniques are classified either as control-flow or as data-flow. The former is designed to detect when an illegal jump has occurred during application execution to possibly proceed with the resolution of the correct jump address or at least signaling that such an error has occurred. The latter checks if a data variable being read is correct or not.
While the effects of data-flow SIHFT methods are clear (usually, the duplication of program variables or the addition of variable checksums solves the problem), the impacts of the control-flow ones, are yet not well understood. Because the control-flow methods modify the program's control-flow graph (CFG), which happens to be the same artifact used by compiler optimizations, the efficiency of control-flow reliability techniques might be influenced by the optimizations in an unpredictable way.
In this paper, we evaluate how the cumulative usage of compiler optimizations influence reliability of applications hardened with the state-of-the-art Automatic Correction of Control-flow Errors (ACCE) (Vemu, Gurumurthy and Abraham, 2007) control-flow SIHFT technique, which is selected, because it is the current most efficient method in terms of reliability, attaining an error correction rate of ~70%.
The application set we use in this paper is drawn from the MiBench suite (Guthaus et al., 2001) .
RADIATION EFFECTS ON SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
Highly energized radiation particles are known hazard sources in electronics since the 1970s (Binder et al., 1975) , as well as the mitigation schemes for such sources. Single-Event Transient (SET) is the observed physical effect of radiation on electronics, corresponding to voltage glitches in circuitry, which by itself does not incur on system hazards. System hazards originate when SETs are caught up by memories (e.g., SRAM's) and sequential logic (e.g., registers), thus, becoming a Single-Event Upset (SEU). An SEU is a non-permanent damage to the systems (i.e., transient) that results in a bit with logical value 1 that flips to 0 and vice-versa. Mitigation approaches might be as follows:
• Substrate and gate-level: The reduction of charge generation and collection.
• Hardware design: The modification of circuit response through the addition of logical elements or even the storage of data on spatially separated nodes. • System level: The addition of redundancy at system level, e.g., software hardening.
Definitely, the system level mitigation approach is the most feasible for components off-the-shelf and to overcome ITAR restrictions. A bit flip caused by a radiation-induced SEU can compromise the software in two different ways. Firstly, an SEU can corrupt data, i.e., the values of program variables. Secondly, an SEU can corrupt control, i.e., the program flow of execution. To illustrate these two situations, consider the program presented in Fig. 1 , which corresponds to the Bubble Sort algorithm. Bubble Sort is a naïve O(n 2 ) solution for sorting an array of arbitrary numbers. The Bubble Sort algorithm is divided in labeled regions named basic blocks (identified by the gray and white regions in the Bubble Sort source code). A basic block is a region of a program where the contained program instructions does not contain any branch, i.e., iteration loops (e.g., for and while commands), if-conditionals, function call, and return. Therefore, a basic block only contains variable assignments and logical evaluations. The CFG of a program P is a graph G P =(V, E), where the set V of vertices contains the program's basic blocks and the set E of edges contains the transitions in the execution flow. To illustrate this, the CFG of the Bubble Sort algorithm is presented in Fig. 2 .
An executed branch of the program P (represented by an arrow in Fig. 2 ) is said to be legal, if and only if, it is an element The blue arrow is a legal branch (together with the black arrows), the purple arrow is a wrong branch, and the red arrow is an illegal branch.
of the set E of G P and the condition to execute it is satisfied (e.g., the blue arrow in Fig. 2) ; it is wrong if the executed branch is an element of the set E, but its condition to execute cannot be satisfied (e.g., the purple arrow in Fig. 2) ; and an executed branch is wrong if it is not an element of the set E (e.g., the red arrow in Fig. 2) .
A control-flow error (CFE) occurs when either a wrong or illegal branch is executed. Notice that in these two cases, a CFE cannot exist if the program execution is not corrupted, i.e., an illegal branch cannot exist in a correct program execution, because it only executes branches from the set E; a wrong branch cannot exist, because it is always possible to satisfy the logical conditions of all branches if program execution is correct. A CFE can be created by a radiation-induced SEU in any of the following three scenarios:
• A non-branch instruction being executed changes into a non-valid branch, i.e., the operation code data is corrupted.
• The target address of a valid branch is corrupted.
• One of the variables composing a logical expression that activates a branch is corrupted.
Scenarios (1) and (2) leads to an illegal branch, and scenario (3) leads to a wrong branch.
A data-flow error (DFE) is caused by a radiation-induced SEU that corrupts variables within a basic block. A DFE might lead to erroneous results or even to a CFE, in case the corrupted variable is used in a logical expression controlling a branch. The focus of this paper is CFE's. For an extensive review of mitigation techniques of CFE and DFE, interested readers may refer to the work of Goloubeva et al., (2006) . Algorithm Bubblesort(input: n, V) def n : number of values to sort; def V[n] : array of size n; def temp, i, j: integer variables; 1. i := n -1; 2. while ( i >= 1 ) do 3.
end if 10.
j := j + 1; 11. end while 12.
i := i -1; 13. end while 14. return V;
The detection of transient CFE was established in the literature with techniques that check assertions during runtime. The general idea is to compute signatures identifying each basic block, and checking the signatures generated during compilation and runtime. If they do not match, an error is signaled. CFE's were first identified by the usage of watchdog processors, which are intrusive in the hardware design ( Saxena and McCluskey, 1990) . Lately, techniques based on the signature checking scheme in software, such as the Control-flow Checking Approach (CCA) (Kanawati et al., 1996) , were identified, but with a coverage rate of only 38% and a performance overhead of 50%.
Advances in the signature checking method offered some improvements on coverage and performance, such as the Control-Flow Checking by Software Signatures, which incurs in 50% of overhead in execution time and program size (Oh et al., 2002) . The most efficient technique of signature checking capable of correcting errors is the ACCE (Vemu et al., 2007) , which incurs in approximately 20% of overhead in execution time to produce an average 70% of correct answers in fault-injection campaigns. However, ACCE is not capable of correcting errors that occur within a basic block, i.e., in the data flow; hence, the use of complementary techniques is required. When ACCE is enhanced with data-flow correction, its coverage rate achieves the average of 91.6% (Vemu et al., 2007) .
Because the CFG is one of the most important software artifacts used by compilers when analyzing and modifying programs, it is important to measure how the compiler impacts the reliability of the software mitigation techniques for radiation-induced CFE. The understanding of these impacts is imperative to employ software mitigation techniques in real systems. This paper presents a study using the ACCE mitigation technique, which is briefly reviewed in the next section.
AUTOMATIC CORRECTION OF CONTROL-FLOW ERRORS
ACCE (Vemu et al., 2007 ) is a software technique for reliability that detects and corrects CFE's due to random and arbitrary bit-flips that might occur during software execution. The hardening of an application with ACCE is done at compilation, because it is implemented as a transformation pass in the compiler. ACCE modifies the applications' basic blocks with the insertion of extra instructions that perform the error detection and correction during software execution. In this section, we briefly explain how the ACCE works in two separate subsections, one dedicated to error detection and the other to error correction are discussed in the subsequent subsections. The reader should refer to the ACCE article for a detailed presentation and experimental evaluation (Vemu et al., 2007) . The fault model that ACCE assumes is further described in the "Fault Model and Methodology" section.
Control-Flow Error Detection
ACCE performs online detection of CFE-s by checking the signatures in the beginning and in the end of each basic block of the CFG, thus, ACCE is classified as a signature checking SIHFT technique as termed in the published literature. The basic block signatures are computed and generated during compilation; the signature generation is critical, because it requires computing non-aliased signatures between the basic block, i.e., each block must be unambiguously identified. In addition, for each basic block found in the CFG, two additional code regions are added, the header and the footer. The signature checking during execution takes place inside these code regions. Figure 3 shows two basic blocks (labeled as N2 and N6) with the additional code regions. The top region corresponds to the header and the bottom to the footer. Still, at compilation, the ACCE creates two additional blocks for each function, namely the function entry block and the Function Error Handler (FEH). For instance, Fig. 3 depicts a portion of two functions, f1 and f2, both owning entry blocks labeled as F1 and F2, and FEHs, labeled as FEH_1 and FEH_2, respectively. Finally, ACCE creates a last extra block, the Global Error Handler (GEH), which can only be reached from a FEH block. The role of these blocks will be presented soon.
At runtime, the ACCE maintains a global signature register (represented as S), which is constantly updated to contain the signature of the basic block that the execution has reached. Therefore, during the execution of the header and footer code regions of each basic block, the value of the signature register is compared with the signatures generated during compilation for those code regions, and if those values do not match, a CFE is detected and then the control should be transferred to the corresponding FEH block of the function where the execution takes place at that time. The ACCE also maintains the current function register (represented as F), which stores the unique identifier of the function currently being executed. The current function register is only assigned at the extra entry function block. This process encompasses the detection of an illegal and erroneous branch due to a soft error. Figure 3 depicts an example of the checking and update of signatures performed in execution time that occurs in a basic block. In this example, the CFE occurs in the block N2 of function F1, where an illegal jump incorrectly transfers the control flow to the basic block N6 of function F2. When the execution reaches the footer of the block N6, the signature register S is checked against the signature generated at compilation. In this case, S = 0111 (i.e., the previous value assigned in the header of the block N2). Thus, the branch test in the N6 footer will detect that the expected signature does not match with the value of S, and thus, the CFE must be signaled (step 1 in Fig. 3 ). In this example, the application branches to the address f2_err, making the application enter the FEH_2 block (because the error was detected by a block owned by the function F2, the FEH invoked is the FEH_2). At this point, the CFE is detected and ACCE can proceed with the correction of the detected CFE.
Control-Flow Error Correction
The correction process starts as soon as an illegal jump is detected by the procedure described in the last subsection, with the control flow transferred to the FEH corresponding to the function where the CFE is found. The FEH checks if the illegal jump was originated in the function it is responsible to handle its detected errors by comparing the value of the function's identifier (F1 or F2, in the example of Fig. 3 ) with the current function register F. If the error occurred in the function stored in the F register, FEH evaluates the current value of the signature register and then transfers the control to the basic block that is the origin of the illegal jump (this origin is stored in the S register). On the other hand, if the illegal jump is not originated in the function where the detection has occurred, the FEH then transfers the control flow to the GEH. In this case, the GEH is responsible for identifying the function where the CFE has occurred and to transfer the control flow back to this function, so that the error is correctly treated by the function's FEH. The GEH searches the function where the error has occurred and transfers the control to its entry block, which then sends the control flow to the proper FEH so that the error can be corrected, i.e., branching the control to the basic block where the CFE has occurred. Recalling the example depicted in Fig. 3 , after the CFE is detected and the control is transferred to FEH_2 (step 1), the F register is matched against the function identifier of the function from where the control originated. However, because the CFE originated in the basic block N2 of the function F1, F = 1. Therefore, FEH_2 is not capable of finding the basic block where the CFE originated, and then it transfers the control to the GEH so that the correct FEH can be found (step 2). The GEH searches for the function identifier stored in F, until it finds that it should branch to F1 (step 3). Upon reaching the entry block F1, the variable err_flag=1, because it is assigned to 1 in the GEH, meaning that there is an error that should be fixed, thus, the control branches to FEH_1 (step 4). Now, because F=1, FEH_1 knows that it is the FEH capable of handling the CFE and, as such, it sets the variable err_flag to 0. Finally, it searches for the basic block that has the signature equal to the register S. Upon finding it, the control branches to this basic block, i.e., N2 in Fig. 3 (step 5 ). This last branch restores the control flow to the point of the program right before the occurrence of the CFE. Notice that inside all the FEH and the GEH, there is the variable num_error, counting how many times the control has passed through a FEH or a GEH. This acts as a threshold for the number of how many times the correction must be attempted, which is necessary to avoid an infinite loop in case the registers F or S get corrupted for any reason. This process concludes the correction of a CFE with the ACCE.
FAULT MODEL AND METHODOLOGY
The fault model we assume in the experiments is the single bit flip, i.e., only one bit of a word is changed when a fault is injected. The ACCE is capable of handling multiple bit flip as long as the bits flipped is within a same word.
Because the fault injection, as it will be discussed later, guarantees that the injected fault ultimately turned into a manifested error, it does not matter how many bits are flipped, i.e., there is no silent data corruption, meaning the faults that cause a word to change its value neither change the behavior of the program nor its output. This could happen in the case that the fault flipped the bits of a dead variable. Because the ACCE is a SIHFT technique to detect and correct CFE-s, the adopted fault model simulates three distinct control-flow disruptions that might occur due to a CFE. Remember that a CFE is caused by the execution of an illegal branch to a possibly wrong address. The branch errors considered in this paper are as follows:
• Branch creation: The program counter is changed, transforming an arbitrary instruction (e.g., an addition)
into an unconditional branch.
• Branch deletion: The program counter is set to the next program instruction to execute independently if the current instruction is a branch.
• Branch disruption: The program counter is disrupted to point to a distinct and possibly wrong destination instruction address. -adce -loop-reduce
We implemented a software fault injector, using the GDB (GNU Debugger), in a similar fashion as implemented by Krishnamurthy et al., (1998) , which is an accepted fault-injection methodology in the embedded systems domain, to perform the fault-injection campaigns. The steps of the fault-injection process are the following:
• The LLVM-IR program resulting from the compilation with a set of optimization and with ACCE is translated to the assembly language of the target machine.
• The execution trace in assembly language is extracted from the program execution with GDB.
• A branch error (branch creation, deletion, or disruption) is randomly selected. On an average, each branch error accounts for 1/3 of the amount of injected errors.
• One of the instructions from the trace obtained in step 2 is chosen at random for fault injection. In this step, a histogram of each instruction is computed because instructions that execute more often have a higher probability to be disrupted.
• If the chosen instruction in step 4 executes n times, choose at random an integer number k with 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
• Using GDB, a breakpoint is inserted right before the k-th execution of the instruction selected in step 4.
• During program execution, upon reaching the breakpoint inserted in step 6, the program counter is intentionally corrupted by flipping one of its bits to reproduce the branch error chosen in step 3.
• The program continues its execution until it finishes.
A fault is only considered valid, if it has generated a CFE, i.e., silent data corruption and segmentation faults were not considered to measure the impacts of the compiler optimizations on reliability. All the experiments in this paper were performed in a 64-bit Intel Core i5 2.4 GHz desktop with 4 GB of RAM and the LLVM compiler version 2.9. For all program versions, where each version corresponds to the program compiled with a set of optimizations plus the ACCE pass, 1,000 faults were injected using the aforementioned fault-injection scheme. In the experiments we considered ten benchmark applications from the MiBench (Guthaus et al., 2001 ) embedded benchmark suite as follows : basicmath, bitcount, crc32, dijkstra, fft, patricia, quicksort, rijndael, string search , and susan (comprising susan corners, edge, and smooth).
IMPACT OF COMPILER OPTIMIZATIONS ON SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
This section studies the impacts on software reliability when an application is compiled with a set of compiler optimizations and further hardened with the ACCE method. Throughout this section, the baseline for all comparisons is an application compiled with the ACCE method without any other compiler optimization. The ACCE performs detection and correction of CFE-s, thus all data discussed in this section considers the correction rate as the data to compute the efficiency metric. In this analysis, we use 58 optimizations provided by the LLVM production compiler. Finally, the results were obtained using the fault model and fault injection methodology described in the section "Fault
Model and Methodology".
The impact of the compiler optimizations when compiling for reliability is measured in this paper using the metric Relative Improvement Percentage (RIP; Pan and Eigenmann, 2006) . The RIP is presented in Eq. 1, where F i is a compiler optimization, E(F i ) is the error correction rate obtained for a hardened application compiled with F i , and E B is the error correction rate obtained for the baseline, i.e., the application compiled only with ACCE and without any optimization.
(1) Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the obtained RIP for each application, with each of the 58 LLVM optimizations being a point in the y-axis. Each point represents the hardened application compiled with a single LLVM optimization at a time, with each application compiled with 58 distinct optimizations. Figure 4 shows that several optimizations increase the RIP considerably, sometimes reaching a RIP of ~10%. This is a great result, which shows that reliability can be increased for free by just picking appropriate optimizations that facilitates for ACCE the process of error detection and correction. However, we also find that some optimizations totally jeopardize reliability, reaching a RIP of -73.27% (bottom filled red circle for bitcount).
It is also possible to gather evidence that the structure of the application also influences how an optimization has an impact on the RIP of reliability. Let us consider the blockplacement optimization, which is represented by the white diamond in Fig. 4 . In the case of the qsort application, block-placement has a RIP of -42.75% and a RIP of +11.68%.
The reader can notice that other optimizations also show this behavior (increasing RIP for some applications and decreasing it for others). It also happens that some hardened applications are less sensitive to compiler optimizations, as it is the case of the crc_32 one, where the RIP is within the ±5% interval around the baseline. Usually compiler optimizations are applied in bulk, using several of them during compilation. Therefore, it is also important to examine if successive optimization passes could compromise or increase software reliability of a hardened application. Figure 6 presents the error correction rate RIP, where the hardened application was compiled with a subset of the 58 LLVM optimizations. In this experiment, we used six sizes of subsets: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 58. The RIP shown in is not subject to the much severe reduction that was measured when only a single optimization was used (Fig. 4) , providing an evidence that the composition of distinct optimization may be beneficial for reliability.
Based on the data and experiments discussed in this section, it is clear that selection of compiler optimizations requires the software designer to take into the consideration that some optimizations may not be adequate in terms of reliability for a given application. Moreover, data also shows that a given optimization is not only by itself a source of reliability reduction; reliability is also dependent of the application being hardened, and how a given optimization facilitates or not the work of the ACCE technique. 
RELATED WORK
Much attention has been devoted to the impact of compiler optimizations on program performance in the published literature. However, the understanding of how those optimizations work together and how they influence each other is a rather recent research topic. The Combined Elimination (CE) (Pan and Eigenmann, 2006) is an analysis approach to identify the best sequence of optimizations for a given application set using the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC). The authors discuss that simple orchestration schemes between the optimizations can achieve near-optimal results as if it has performed an exhaustive search in all the design space created by the optimizations. CE is a greedy approach that first compiles the programs with a single optimization, using this version as the baseline. From those baseline versions, the set of RIP is calculated, which is the percentage that the program's performance is either reduced or increased. With the RIP at hand for all baselines, the CE starts removing the optimizations with negative RIP, until the total RIP of all optimizations applied into a program do not reduce. CE was evaluated in different architectures, achieving an average RIP of 3% for the SPEC2000, and up to 10% in case of the Pentium IV for the floating point applications.
The Compiler Optimization Level Exploration (COLE) (Hoste and Eeckhout, 2008) is another approach to achieve performance increase by selecting a proper optimization s equence. COLE uses a population-based multi-objective optimization algorithm to construct a Paretto optimal set of optimizations for a given application using the GCC compiler. The data found with COLE give some insightful results about how the compiler optimizations behave when they are applied with several of them at the same time. For instance, 25% of the GCC optimizations appear in at most one Paretto set, and some of them appear in all sets. Therefore, 75% of all the optimizations do not contribute to improve the performance, meaning that they can be safely ignored! COLE also shows that the quality of an optimization is highly tied with the application set.
The Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) (M ukherjee et al., 2003) is a metric to estimate the probability that the bits in a given hardware structure will be corrupted by a soft error when executing a certain application. The AVF is calculated as the total time the vulnerable bits remains in the hardware architecture. For example, the register file has a 100% AVF, because all of its bits are vulnerable in case of a soft error. The AVF metric is highly influenced by the application due to liveness of program's variables. For instance, a dead variable has a 0% AVF, because it is not used in a computation. The impact of the GCC optimizations in the AVF metric is evaluated by trying to reduce the AVF-delay-square-product (ADS), introduced by the authors (Jones et al., 2008) . The ADS considers a linear relation of the AVF between the square of the performance in cycles, clearly prioritizing performance over reliability. It is reported that the -O 3 optimization level is detrimental both to the AVF and performance, because the benchmarks that are considered (MiBench) have increased the number of loads executed. Again, it was found that the patricia application was the one with the highest reduction in the AVF at 13%. Bergaoui and Leveugle (2011) analyzed the impact of compiler optimizations on data reliability in terms of variable liveness. Liveness of a variable is the time period between the variable that is written and it is last read before a new write operation. The authors concluded that the liveness is not related only with the compiler optimization, but it also depends on the application being compiled, which is in accordance with the discussion of this paper. This paper shows that some optimizations tend to extend the time a variable is stored in a register instead of memory. The goal behind this is obvious, i.e., it is much faster to fetch the value of a variable when it is in the register than in the memory.
However, the memory is usually more protected than registers because of cheap and efficient error correction code (ECC) schemes, and thus, thinking about reliability, it is not a good idea to expose a variable in a register for a longer time. The solution to that could be the application of ECC, such as Huffman to the program variables itself. Decimal Hamming (DH) ( Argyrides et al., 2011 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we characterized the problem of compiling embedded software for reliability, given that compiler optimizations impact the coverage rate. The study presented in this paper makes clear that selecting optimizations indiscriminately, can decrease software reliability to unacceptable levels, probably avoiding the software to be deployed as originally planned. Embedded software and systems deployed in space applications must always be certified with evidence that they support harsh radiation environments, and given the increasing technology scaling, other safety critical embedded systems might have to tolerate radiation-induced errors in a near future. Therefore, the embedded software engineers must be very careful while compiling the safety critical embedded software.
Future research work is focused on the formalization of the ACCE transformation pass to generate automatic proofs about the correctness of programs compiled with the ACCE.
This step is important to allow the certification of software hardened with ACCE.
